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(L. A. No. 26046.

In Bank.

Jan. 27, 1961.J

JAMES S. REID, Respondent, v. OVERLAND MACHINED
PHODrCTS (a Corporation) ct aI., Appellants.

)

[1] Accord-Effect of Payment of Conceded Part of Disputed
Claim.-Ordinarily the conditional payment of either an
alllount concededly owed or an amount in excess of that concededly owed is sufficient consideration for settlement of n
bona fitle disputed claim, and an offer and acceptance of such
amount given in full payment for the disputed claim discharges the debt.
[2] Labor-Wages-Payment of Amount Due in Case of Dispute.In view of Lab. Code, § 206, providing that in case of a dispute
over wages the employer must pay, without condition and
within a specified time, all wages conceded by him to be due,
leaving to the employee all remedies he might otherwise be
entitled to on any balance claimed, in a dispute over wages
the employer may not withhold wnges concededly due to coerce
settlement of the disputcd balance.
[3] ld.-Wages-Compromise of Dispute.-An employer and employee may compromise a bona fide dispute over wages, but
such a compromise is binding only if it is made after the
wages concededly due have been unconditionally paid.
[4J ld.-Wages-Commissions.-Lab. Code, § 206, applies to conditional tenders of commissions. (Disapproving any implication in Sayre v. Western BOll:l, 76 Cal.App.2d 793, 799, 174
P.2d 466, that cOllllllitisioW'; are different from other wages as
being inconsistent with Lab. Code, § 200, subd. (a).)
[5] Id.-Wages-Payment of Amount Due in Case of Dispute.Lab. Code, § 206, is designed to secure to a wage earner prompt
payment of all wages concededly due, and it expressly precludes an employer's coercing a settlement of disputed claims
by offering conditional payment.
[IJ Payment of undisputed amount or liability as consideration
for discharge of disputed amount or liability, note, 112 A.L.R.
1219. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Accord and Satisfaction, § 31; Am.Jur.,
Accord and Satisfaction, § 60.
(2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Labor, § 19; Am.Jur., Labor, § 808 et 8CfJ.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Accord, § 6; [2-5, 10] Labor, ~ 14:
[6] Statutes, ~ 16; (7] Contracts, § 45; [8, 9] Accord, § 2; [11]
Evidencc, ~ 2-l7; [12] Appeal and Error, § 1716; [13] Master 1111(1
Sen'ant, ~ 59; [14] 1\[aster lind Serv:mt, § 51; (ViJ Evidence, ~ 3!}O;
[16] COli tracts, § 1;)0.
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[6J Statutes-Operation and Effect.-Where a statute prohibits
or attach('s a penalty to the doing of an act, the act is voirl
though the statute docs not expressly pronounce it so.
[7] Contracts - Legality':"'- Contracts in Violation of Statute.-A
statute's imposition of a penalty on the doing of a certain a<!t
implies a prohibition of the act and a contract founded on
such act is void.
[8] Accord-Requisites.-A claim will not be discharged when the
purported accord and satisfaction violates state law.
[9] Id.-Requisites.-Since a discharge of claims byway of accord
and satisfaction is dependent on contract, express or implied,
the essentials necessary to a valid contract generally must be
present in an accord and satisfaction.
[10] Labor-Wages-Payment of Amount Due in Case of Dispute.
-Where two checks were mailed to a former employee as a
single conditional payment in satisfaction of his wages, but at
least the aJllount designated on one check was for the payment of wages concededly due and the tender thereof was conditioned on the release of all additional liability, no accord and
satisfaction could result from the retention or cashing of either
check.
[11] Evidence-Hearsay-Declarations in Papers and Documents.
-Statements in the pleadings or memoranda of counsel as to
matters not in evidence are hearsay, self-serving and incompetent as evidence.
[12] Appeal-Reversible Error-Amount of Recovery.-A judgment must be reversed where the court relied on improper evidence to arrive at it, such as a memorandum of counsel resulting in an increase in the judgment frolll $5,741 to $11,486.52.
[13] Master and Servant-Compensation-Actions-Appeal-Reversible Error.-In an action by a former employee for an accounting for wages and cOlllmissions, defendant was prejudiced·
by the court's reliance on incompetent evidence (memorandum
of counsel) for its determina.tion that the contract requirerl
payment of commissions on "change orders" received before
termination of the contract of employment where defendant
stipulated only to the aDlount of such orders, not to the amount
of the changes therein before or after termination of the
contract, and did not concede liability for commissions on
these orders, where plaintiff was not entitled, under the tt·ia 1
court's interpl'etation of the contract, to commissions on an~·
increases on the "ehange orders" after termination of the contract, and where there was no competent evidence from which
the amount of the ch:IIlg"('s nfter termination of employment
could be computed.

[7] See Ca.l.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 73; Am.Jur., Contracts, § 161.
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[14] Id.-Compensa.tion-Actions-Evidence.-In :m action by a
fonner employee for :m nccountill~ for wn~es lind commis!;ions,
the court erred in excluding E'vidence offerea 1Iy defendant to
aid in interpretation of the written contract of employment,
tending to prove that during the preliminary negotiations the
parties agreed that to Il\'oid tracing the date on each order
for the purpose of determining the 1I1110unt of commission on
termination of the contract the cOlllllli~,:;ion should be paid on
gross business invoiceu during the employment, nnd that plaintiJf was paid and understood the contract to require payment '
of commissions on business invoiced immediately after he began his employment though the orders were obtnined before
his employment.
[16] Evidence-Extrinsic Evidence-In Aid of Int.erpretation.When the language used in a written contract is fairly susceptible to the construction claimed by one of the parties, extrinsic evidence may be cont'idered, not to vary or modify
the terms of the agreement, but to aid the court in ascertaining
its true meaning.
[16J Contracts-Interpretation-Construction by Parties.-Acts of
the parties under a coutract should be used as 3. reliable means
of interpreting an ambiA,"uOus coutract and al'rh:ing at their
intention. While not conclusivE', the construction thus given
a contract by the parties before any controversy has arisen
as to its meaning will, when reasonable, be adopted and enforced by the courts.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Allen '}'. Lynch, Judge. Reversed.
Action for an accounting for wages and commissions allegedly due a former employee. Judgment for plaintiff reversed.
George C. Black and Patrick Kerrigan for Appellants.
John F. Bremer for Respondent.
Pauline Nightingale, Effie Sparling, William P. Nutter and
Milford A. :Maron as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plliintiff was employed by Overland Machined Products Company on J"ebruary 25, 1952, as its
exclusive sales representative. In this action he seeks an
accounting for wages and commissions allegedly earned pursuant to a written contract of employment.
The contract provides: "For his services rendered herein
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and for faithful performance thereof, second party shall
receive a commission of five per cent, (5%) of the entire
gross business done by first party subsequent to 25th day of
February, 1952.
"It is distinctly understood and agreed that second party
shall only be entitled to reeeive any commission or any other
sums of money herein specified on such new business, contracts
or purchase orders as may be obtained or received by first
party subsequent to 25th day of February,. 1952, and only
then so long as this agreement remains in full1'orce and effect. "
The contract guarantees plaintiff certain monthly amounts,
and provides that whenever the commission exceeds the guaranteed amounts the balance of the commission "shall be paid
. . . if as and ,vhen the accounts receivable • . . are paid. "
The monthly guarantees were paid when due and are not ill
dispute. Each party is given the power to terminate the
contract on 30 days' notice.
The contract was terminated effective November 27, 1953.
On February 1u, 1954, plaintiff demanded the payments of
commissions owed to him and a closing of his account. Defendant sent plaintiff a check for $792.14 bearing an endorsement that the payment 'vas" payment in full for all commissions due" under the contract. Plaintiff returned the check
objecting to the endorsement.
Thereafter an accountant employed by plaintiff to examine defendant's books advised defendant that the previous
offer of payment was short $15. Defendant then sent plaintiff
the original check for $792.14 and another check for $15. The
letter accompanying the two checks stated that the payment
was made in full payment of all commissions due under the
contract. Plaintiff cashed. the $15 check, which did not have
a restrictive endorsement, and retained and lost the check
for $792.14. There was no further communication between
the parties until plaintiff filed this action.
The parties stipulated that defendant owes commissions of
$792.14 on orders invoiced to the time of the termination of
employment, and the defendant has paid this amount into
court. Although the parties disagree on defendant's liability
for commissions on orders obtained before the termination of
employment but invoiced after such termination, the amount
of these orders was stipUlated to at the trial. 'rhe effect of
these stipulations is that 5 per cent of such orders is $10,694 1
lThe figure in the original stipUlation was slightly
representa deductions made at plaintiff'a request.

~igher.

ThiB fiaure
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if all the orders are considered or $4,948.95 if the orders that
were changed after their original solicitation are deleted.
The latter orders were referred to by the parties as "change
orders. "
The trial court awarded plaintiff cOl1llnissions on an of the
disputed orders. Defendant challenges this judgment on
three grounds: (1) The court erred in its eonclusion of law
that the evidence failed to establish an accord and satisfaction;
(2) the court relied on incompetent evidence in detcrmining
that plaintiff is entitled to commissions on the "change orders"; and (3) the court erroneously excluded extrinsic
evidence offered to prove that the parties intended that commissions should be paid only on orders invoiced during the
employment.
The trial court correctly ruled that there was no accord
and satisfaction. Either all or at least $792.14 of the amount
of defendant's offer to plaintiff was for wages concededl~
owed to him. [1] Ordinarily the conditional payment of
either an amount concededly owed or an amount in excess
of that concededly owed is sufficient consideration for a settlement of a bona fide disputed claim. (Potter v. Pacific Coast
Lumber Co., 37 Ca1.2d 592, 602 [234 P.2d 16] ; 'see Corbin on
Contracts, vo1. 6, § 1289, p. 128) and an offer and acceptance
of such an amount given in full payment for the disputed
claim therefore discharges the debt.
[2] Labor Code, section 206, however, places wage claims
in a separate category. That section provides: "In case of
a dispute over wages, the employer shall pay, with01d condition
and within the time set by this article, all wages, or part
thereof, conceded by him to be due, leaving to the employee
all remedies he might otherwise be entitled to as to any balance
claimed." (Italics added.) Hence in a dispute over wages
the employer may not withhold wages concededly due to coerce
settlement of the disputed balance. [3] An employer and
employee may of course compromise a bona fide dispute over
wages but such a compromise is binding only if it is made
after the wages concededly due have been unconditionally paid.
[4] Defendants invoke Sayre v. Western Bowl, 76 Cal.
App.2d 793, 799 [174 P.2d 466], for the proposition that
section 206 of the Labor Code does not apply to conditional
tenders of commissions or bonuses. That case involved the
collection of penalty wages and not an accord and satisfaction.
Any implication therein that commissions are different from
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other wages is inconsistent with Labor Code, section 200,
subdivision (a) 2 and is disapproved.
[5] Defendant's contention that Labor Code, Rectioll 206,
merely proviues a statutory remedy for its breach but docs
not invalidate an accord and satisfaction entered into in violation of the statute is without merit. Section 206 is deRigned
to secure to the wage earner prompt payment of aU wages
concededly due and it expressly precludes an employer's
coercing a settlement of disputed claims by Offering conditional
payment. [6] "Where a statute prohibits or attaches a
penalty to the doing of an act, the act is void even though
the statute does not expressly pronounce it so .. " [7] The
imposition by statute of a penalty implies a prohibition of the
act referred to and a contract founded upon such act is void."
(Stonehockel' v. Oassano, 154 Cal.App.2d 732, 736 [316 P.2d
717]; accord: Smith v. Bach, 183 Cal. 259, 262 [191 P. 14].)
[ 8 ] It has long been settled that a claim will not be diRcharged when the purported accord aIHI satisfaction violates
the state law. [9] In Sierra etc. Park 00. v. Universal Elec.
etc. 00., 197 Cal. 376, 387 [241 P. 76], we refused to discharge
a claim because the alleged accord and satisfaction would have
resulted in utility payments contrary to the law, stating that:
4' 'The discharge of claims by way of accord and satisfaction
is dependent upon contract express or implied; and it follows
that the essentials necessary to valid contracts generally must
be present in a contract of accord and satisfaction.' "
[10] The two checks were mailed to plaintiff as a single
conditional payment in satisfaction of his claim for wages.
Since at least $792.14 was for the payment of wages concededly due and the tender thereof was conditioned on the
rclease of all additional liability no accord and satisfaction
could result from the retention or cashing of either check.
Plaintiff was therefore entitled to recovcr on the contract.
We have concluded, however, that the judgment must be
reversed because of errors in the admission and exclusion of
evidence.
The trial court relied on incompetent evidence for its determination that the contract required payment of commissions on the "change orders." At the f'nd of the trial th~
court instructed plaintiff's attorney to prepare findings and
·Subdivision (a) of Labor Code, section 200, defines wages ns follows:
" • Wages' includes all amounts for labor performed by employees
of every des<!ription, whether the nmount i.~ fixe.l or nseertained by the
standard of time, task, piece, commission basis, or other method of cnl·
culation.' ,
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judgment awarding plaintiff the $;92.14 concededly due and
$4,948.95 representing 5 percent commission 011 all unchanged
orders obtained before termination of employment regardless
of when inyoiced. The court stated, however, that the "change
orders" amounting to $115,625.61 are not part of the "gross
business done" under the contract and" accordingly plaintiff
is not entitled to commission thereon." Plaintiff then submitted a "Memorandum ..\.fter Examining Change Order,
Purchase Orders and Invoices." In this memorandum plaintiff stated that he had just spent throo days reviewing defendant's invoices and that most of the changes on the
"change orders" were 111ade before the termination of the employment contract and that the rt>maining ehang<'s w('re of a
minor n~ture. After rCl'iting some or these chall~l's plaintiff'!'!
attorney suggested that plaintiff he awardefl commis!'!ions on
$114,908.76 of the $115,625.61 "change order!'!." The court
then awarded plaintiff a ju(lf!ment for $11,486.52 instead of
$5,741.09 as it had originally propo!'.Cd.
[11] The "Memorandum Aftt'r Examining Change Orde:-r!'!.
Purchase Order!'! anel Im'oices" "'as simply an assertion of
facts by counsel all to matters not in eviden('e. Defendant
l1ad no opportunity to cross-t>xamine plnintiff'~ ('ounsel on
the stat<'mt'nt or to offer evidence in rebuttal. Statements in
the ple:-adingR or memorllnda of eonnsel arc heat'sa~', self.s('TYing, and incompetent as evidenct'. (Jeffers v. Screen Extra.,
(;11/711, blr., 134 CaJ.App.2tl 622, 623 [286 r.2<l 301 ; JIitslIlIchi
y. SeclIrity-First National Balik, 103 Cal.App.2d 214. 219
[229 P.2rl 376] ; s('c 6 Wigmore, Evidf'l1<.'(', § 1709, pp. 39-40.)
[12] Rplinu('c hy the court on thi!'! memorandum was
clearly prejuilicial, for it reslllt('d in an increase:- in the judl!ment from $5,741 to $11,486.52. A jnc1~m('nt mnst be revt>r~('rl
wh('n it is ('lear tllat n court has r('li('o on improper eviden('t>
to arrive at it. (Fcu·c1. Y. FCII'f'7. 23 C'al.2d 43], 433 r144
P.2d 592] ; O. O. Ba.shaw 00. v. Woo(l & Stl!vens, Inc., 72 CAL
App. 94. 101 [236 P. 346].)
[13] Plaintiff contends, ho,yewr, that tIle court's reliance
on the memorandum was not preju(licinl, on the grollJl(l thnt
the pm-ties had stipulat('d that $115,625.61 of "change order;;"
were received be:-forc the t('rminntioll of the pontraet. Df'fendant stiplilated only to the amount of such orc1t'rs and
not to the amonnt of the ('han.~cs therein before or after the
termination of the contra<'t and (lill not concede liahility for
commissions on thl'se or<1t>r". rnd<'r the trial ('onrt's internr!'tation of the ('ontract plaintiff is 110t entitled to commissions

)
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on allY increases on the" change oruers" after the termination
or the contract. There is 110 competent eviucnee in the record
from wlloich the amount of the changes after the termination
of employment can be computed.
[ 14] The trial court also erred in excluding evidence
offered to aid in the interpretation of the contract. Defendant
offered to prove that during prdimillary negotiations the
parties agreed that to avoid trac·ing the date on each order for
the purpose of determining the amouut of commission upon
termination of the contract, t1}e commission should be paid
upon the gross business invoiced during the employment.
Defendant further offered to prove that plaintiff was paid
and understood the contract to require payment of commissions on business invoiced immediately after he began his
employment even though the orders were obtained before his
employment.
This evidence should have been admitted. [15] When
the language used in the contract is fairly susceptible to the
construction claimed by one of the parties, extrinsic evidence
may be considered, not to vary or modify the terms of the
agreement, but to aid the court in ascertaining its trne meaning. (Beneficial etc. Ins. 00. v. Kutt Hitke & 00., 46 Ca1.2d
517,524 [297 P.2d 428].) [16] "'The acts of the parties
under the contract airora one of the most reliable means of
arriving at their intention; and, \vhile not conclusive, tIle construction thus given to a contract by the parties befol"e any
('olltroversy has arii'len as to its meaning \vill, when reasonable,
he adopted and enforcea by the courts.'" (Orestview Oemefrry Assn. v. Dier1en, 54 Cal.App.2d 744, 7G3 [8 Ca1.Rptr.
427, 356 P.2d 171].)
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J.,
and Dooling, J., concurred .
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